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Change in Market Assessments of
Deposit—Institution Riskiness
ABSTRACT
Using the Goldfeld and Quandt switching regression method, this paper
investigates variability over 1915-85 in the risk components of bank and
saving and loan stock. We develop evidence that the market-beta, interest:
sensitivity,andresidualrisk of deposit-institution stock vary
significantly during this period. Reassessing previous event studies in
light of these findings suggests that event-study methods tend to overreach
their data.
Edward J Kane
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I. Introduction:
Testifying before the House of Representatives in December 1984, the
U.S. Comptroller of the Currency posed the following questions:
Is banking becoming riskier? Are large banks riskier than
small banks? What effect has interest rate deregulation
had on the risks faced by the banking system?.. We do not
have good answers to these questions.
This paper deploys statistical methods to develop new evidence on these
issues. Using capital market data for 1975-1985, we investigate temporal
variability in market and interest-rate sensitivity and in unsystematic risk
for savings and loan associations (S&Ls) and three size classes of banks.
During this decade, deposit institutions faced substantial regulatory and
statutory change and interest rates became extraordinarily volatile.
Our methods focus on estimating the parameters of a two-index model,
allowing the model to switch parameter regimes over 1975-85 in art
unrestricted way. Coldfeld and Quandts [(1972), (1973), (1976)] switching
regression method (CQSRM) is used to determine the temporal variability of
model parameters. CQSRM employs a search procedure which finds maximum-
likelihood estimates of three attributes of regime variation: the shift
dates, the gradualness of each shift, and the parameters of the stochastic
process which obtain in each regime. CQSRM is applied by Quandt (1974) and
Lin and Oh (1984) to solve specific problems of nonstationarity and Unal
(1985) use the approach as a tool of event study.2
The statistical findings and the analysis presented in this paper serve
to reconcile some of the conflicting results developed in the literature on
the two-index model and provide grounds for reassessing traditional event-
study methods. We find that the riskiness of bank and S&L stock declined in
the late-l970s, but rose again in recent years. We show that event studies
focusing on the impact on deposit-institution stock of recent changes in
monetary-policy regimes or regulatory adjustments need to control for other
significant sources of nonstationarity. Allowing for this nonstationarity
suggests that at least over 1979-1982 it is rash to attribute observed
shifts in return-generating processes to any particular information event.
2. Model and Data Selection
This paper's focal return-generating process is the two-index model
developed by Stone (1974). This asset pricing model expands the familiar
market model of asset returns by adding an interest-rate index, in this
application as a quasi-industry factor. Including an interest-rate index as
a second factor could just as easily be justified by I4erton's (1973)
intercemporalcapitalasset pricing model specification. This model
expresses return on asset p as:
RpPo+fimRm+.BiRi+øp . (1)
and ft1aremeasures of the asset's systematic market and interest-rate
risk; and represent stock-market return and a return on a debt index.
Lloyd and Shick (1977), Lynge and Zumwalt (1980), Chance and Lane (1980).
Flannery and James (1984a), Scott and Peterson (1986) and Brewer and Lee3
(1985) investigate the extent to which this model can explain returns on
financial-intermediary stock.
Using the two-index model raises two major problems. First, one must
specify whatever simultaneous relation is presumed to exist between the
variables. Previous authors deal with what is called "multicollinearity"
between and R0 by imposing an arbitrary causal ordering. Because theory
does not impose a zero covariance, ømi between the market return and an
interest rate index, the following orthogonslization, is proposed [Stone
(lg74), Chance and Lane (1980)j.
k - [ O/Om] k (2)
An alternative approach is to treat as exogenous and as endogenous
[Lynge and Zumwalt (1980), Flannery and James (1982)]. This produces the
adjusted market factor,
-[0 /o]k m m mi (3)
Either an adjusted interest-rate index, or an adjusted market factor;
C,maybe incorporated into Equation (1). In both cases, orthogonal series
are generated, which eliminate simultaneity by
Ciliberto (1985) elaborates, using Equation
interest-rate sensitivity, while using Equation
bias. Either auxiliary regression grafts a
structure onto the two-index model. We would
construction. However, as
(2) biases t-tests against
(3) imposes the opposite
nonsimultaneoustriangular
need additional theory to4
specify either that R, drives the interest rate, that R1 is logically prior
to m' or that both variables are governed by omitted exogenous forces.
Becausetheparameter space spanned is the same whether or not we impose
either auxiliary regression, this paper employs the unorthogonalized two-
indexmodel.
A second problem is to select a proxy for unanticipated changes in R.
One approach is to pick an interest-rate index, estimate synthetic forecasts
xisanautoregressive model, and use forecast errors from this model as
proxies forunanticipated interest-rate changes (Flannery and James
(l984a)). An alternative approach is to use changes in the yield on a given
maturity of long-term bondstocapture unanticipated changes in interest
rates LScott and Peterson (1986); Sweeney and Warga (1986)). Yet another
approach is to proxy unanticipated changes in interest rates by the
difference between the spot 3-month Treasury bill rate at time tandthe
forward3-month Treasury bill rate imbedded in the yield curve at time t-l
(Mishkin(1982) and Brewer and Lee (1985)J.Unaland Kane (1987a) also
examine the impact of choosing between unanticipated and anticipated series
forboth long andshort interest-rate indices. Their analysis indicates
that, although bank and S&L stock returns are not responsive to short rates.
longrates have a significant effect. This pattern holds irrespective of
whetherinterest rates are proxied by errors from autoregressive forecasts
or by components orthogonal to Rm• Relying on Occam's Razor, this paper5
employs unadjusted holding-period returnsonlong-term government bonds to
proxy the unanticipated changes in the interest-rate index.
Oursamples are constructed from data tapesprepared by the Center for
Researchin Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago. All
commercialbanks and S&Ls are selected for which CRSP tapes show monthly
returns for the 1975-85 period.2 Appendix I lists these large banks and
S61s and gives their asset size. To test for possible intra-industry
differences, banks are further classified into three classes.Following a
suggestionfrom Joseph Sinkey, a class of "money-center banks"isdetermined
from Citicorp's competitor list (Sinkey, 1986, p.249).Other banksare
classified as 'superregional" and "regional" banks, based on an asset-size
thresholdof $10 billion. Partitioning banks in this way allows for
differences in the extent to which the nondeposit debt of different
institutions is effectively guaranteed by the FDIC and develops classes of
banks that may be presumed to operate similarly. At the end of 1984, the
mean asset sizes of the money-center, superregional, and regional banks are
$73.6, $20.6, and $4.5 billion. Sample S&Ls average $13.7 billion. Total
assets of the 31 banks and 8 S&Ls in our sample are $973 billion and $109.6
billion, respectively. Expressed as a percentage of respective industries'
asset totals, sample banks constitute about 43percent and sample S&Lsabout
12percent.
Equal-weightedportfolio returns are constructed for each class. The
CR5? value-weighted NYSE andAMEX stockindex adjusted for dividends is used6
asthe market proxy. Interest rates are proxied by the monthly holding-
period returnonlong-term government bonds, obtained from Ibbotson
Associates (1986). As Flannery and James (1984) point out, "since the
holdingperiod returns on bonds are negatively correlated with changes in
the levelof interest rates, a positive value for P1impliesthat the firm's
marketvalue declines when interest rates rise."
3. Estiaatin the Model Over Prior Studies Observation Periods
Unal and Kane(1987a)emphasize that the qualitative force of empirical
evidence on the two-index model varieswith the market proxy and the
interest-rate index used, the time period analyzed, the frequency with which
dataare observed, and the number of institutions sampled. Because our
sample and model specification both differ fromprevious studies, for
comparative purposes Table 1 reports how our sample and proxy specifications
behave over the specific time periodsanalyzed by Flanneryand James (1984),
Scott and Peterson (1986), and Brewer and Lee (1985).
Inthese studies andinourparallelruns, bankstock returns show a
market-beta of considerably less than unity. This finding portrays the
marketrisk of bankstocks as below average. Other studies develop similar
results.For example, Smirlockand Kaufold (1987), relying on 1982 data,
estimate market-betas for23 banks, most of which are below one. They go on
to note that, "This ...isconsistent with the ft's reported for bank
portfolios by Flannery and James (1984a, 1984b) and Smirlock (1984)."
Estimatesof interest-rate sensitivity proveparallel as well. Bank
stockreturnsaresignificantly interest-rate sensitive andinversely7
related to changes in interest rates (which means positively related to
holding-periodreturns). However, on this issue, conflicting evidence may be
foundinthe literature. Chance and Lane(1980)find an insignificant
interest-ratecoefficient for the two-index model during1972-76. Sweeney
and Warga (1986) report similar results for the sane period. In examining
variation over the 1960-1979 period. Sweeney and Warga report a lack of
interest-rate sensitivity during 1970-1974 and 1975-1979.Theyfind
significant interest-rate sensitivity for the 1965-1969 subperiod.
To permit our resultsto be weighed against 1975-79 estimates by Chance
andLane(1980) and Sweeney and Warga (1986), the fourth panel of Table 1
applies our two-index model to the 1975-1979 period. During this era, our
sample banks also show no significant sensitivity to changes in interest
rates. Interestingly, the sample shows a market-beta slightly over unity
duringthissubperiod. These comparisons show thatwhenour model
specificationis applied to our sample banks in periods examined by other
studies, similar findingsobtain.
We next compare results for the portfolio of our 8 sample S&Lswith an
S&L sample studied by Brickley and James (1986).To analyze how access to
depositinsurance affects stock returns of S&L.s, Brickley and James estimate
shifts in the sensitivity of 561 stock to mortgage bond prices and market
returns.They analyze the period 1976-82. To test for a shift in interest-
rate elasticity and market beta in January 1980, they fit the following
model:8
a— 0.004+ 1.41 -0.874 . Pt(0.02) (0.287) (0.281)
& —0.002 + 1.51 a- 0.25R .D,
Pt (0.001) (0.125) at (0.110) at
Ris the weekly holding-period return on an equally weighted portfolio of
20 SM. stocks, is the weekly holding-period return on the GNNA index in
week t, and D is a dummy variable that has the value of one except during
the calendar year 1979, when it is set at zero. Standard errors are given in
parentheses.The slope that is shifting in the first equation relates SM.
stock prices to an index of' SM. asset returns proxied by the GNM& index. The
slope permitted to shift in the second equation is the market-beta of SM.
stock.
Estimating these models in the same years with the monthly data of our
sample gives:
R —0.009+2.390 -0.794. p (0.01) (1.005) (1.056)





Although our coefficient estimates are qualitatively similar to those of
Brickley and James, our negative slope shifts are not statistically
significant.The loss of significance may traceto the reduced number of
firmsin our sample and to the fourfold reduction in observations that
occurs in moving from weekly to monthly data.9
4. Testinw the Parameter Stationarity Wmothesis with Switchinf Rearessions
Tble 1 indicate,thatmarket andinterest-rate sensitivities varywith
the subperiod chosen. To run meaningfulregressions,onemustinvestigate
thepossibility of model nonstationarity.
Before drawing substantive inferences from a specific model and data
set, researchers should allow for potential inadequacies in measurement,
sampling, and specification. Empirical literature in finance supporting the
arbitrage-pricing model assures us that generalized market models employed
in policy analysis and as benchmarks for event studies are importantly
misspecified.Parameters of a misspecified model may be interpreted as
coefficientsof an incompletely or partially Nreduced*form.Estimates of
theparameters of a partially reduced form shift with variation in the
contributionsof various relevant forces whose direct influence is excluded
from the model. Researchers using daily or weekly data (for example) must
anticipate that, over any time interval of more than a few months, movements
in omitted variables (or otherwise misspecified relations) may render the
parameters of included variables nonstationary.Thispotential for
nonstationarityimparts unreliability to parameter estimates derived from
pooling time-series data thatarenot put through a battery of prior
stationarity tests.
Policyanalyses and event studies that neglect nonstationarities caused
by variation in omitted variables run a serious risk of sorting out
empirical evidence incorrectly. Formal tests of statistical hypotheses may
develop either falsely positive or falsely negative results. The likelihood10
ofmaking false inferences about the influence of included variables grows
when omittedvariables are correlated with included ones. Similarly, the
odds of observing a positive event-study result increases whenever, during
or in the vicinity of an event window, reinforcing movements occur in
variables for which the model does not control. Conversely, the likelihood
of observingnegative event-study results increases when offsetting
movements in uncontrolled forces (i.e., omitted variables) occur during a
study's focal time intervals.
We employ the Goldfeld-Quandt search routine as a way of developing
policy-analysis or event-study benchmark models that can incorporate the
effects of "relevant" movements in unspecified omitted variables.Although
it would be useful either for us or for other researchers to identify these
omitted variables and to proceed to endogenize the parameter variation we
observe, our goal in this paper is more modest than this. We seek merely to
extend the range of experimental control to capture movements in variables
that standard pricing models omit. In principle, this extension in R21t
control rendersthesequence ofparameter movements estimated by the
switching-regressiontechnique a cleaner benchmark from which to infer the
influence of actual or potential policy actions.
The Goldfeld and Quandt ((1972, 1973, 1976)1 switching-regression
method (GQSRM) provides a flexible way to identify changes in the systematic
and unsystematic risks of asset portfolios. The strength of the technique is
that the number of effective regimes, the parameter values in each regime,
the switch dates at which one regime supersedes another, and the gradualness11
ofeach regime switch can all be estimated simultaneously. To explain 0Q5R14,
wespecify the multi-regime two-indexmodel as follows:
kpt•Pj4 flmjkmt+ fik
+ , j—l,...,k r (4)
In (4), jisthe regime index andej is theregressionresidual distributed
asN(O.o). CQSRN introduces a series of transitional dummy variables, Dj.
If the observations come from r regimes, r-l transitions occur with an equal
number of cutoff points. To permit the transitions to occur gradually, r-l





.1((2w)' exp 2(* )). d( • (5)
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wherej now runs from 1 to r-l and the endpoint values are 0 and 1
by definition.
In (4), the equation representing the k-th regime is then multiplied by
k-i r
7tk II II(1 -Dtj).The resulting equations for r regimes maybe
j—O j—k
addedtogether to obtain the composite equation thatweestimate:
k—l'pttk'k—l(0kmkkmt4- iki +ek)(1kfl
. (6)
Thelikelihood function for the r-regime two-index modelisobtained by
assumingtobe normally distributed with mean,12
k—i
l(PkJmt'fikit1tk)F' and variance, ;—k_ltktk
The likelihood function becomes:
L— log2r—S S Stki D&1tkklDt'. (7)
t—lk—l t—l 2
k—lhOpt
Maximizing (7) with respect to its unknown parameters gives maximum-
likelihood estimates of: the parameters of the regression relation given in
(4);theswitch points, z';andthe gradualness parameterswhich measure
thenonabruptness of the associated structural change. Our objective is to
describe the evolution of the systematic market risk mJ' interest-rate
risk (flu),andunsystematic risk (os) of deposit-institution stock over the
1975-85 period.
Formally, the analysis has two key steps. In the first step, the number
of regimes operative during the analysis period is found. Initially,
maximum-likelihood values for one-regime (L1) and two-regime (L2) models are
obtained using (7). The null hypothesis that no regime switch occurs is
tested against the alternative that two regimes exist (involving one switch
point). Asymptotically, the likelihood-ratio test statistic, -2 ln
has a chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom (d.f.) equal to the
number ofrestrictions underthe nullhypothesis.3 If the alternative
hypothesis is accepted, weproceedto test the possibility of three regimes.13
Then, the null and the alternative hypotheses concern the applicability of
two-regimeandthree-regime processes, respectively. More generally,
whenever the null hypothesis is rejected, the number of regimes is
incremented and the likelihood-ratio test re-run until we fail to reject the
4
null hypothesis.
The second step is to investigate the parametric nature of these
shifts. To illustrate, we may assume k regimes to be established in step
one.Our procedure would be to remaximize the likelihood function for k
regimes, subject to the parameter-equality constraint under examination,
wherethe maximum-likelihood value is written as t. The likelihood-ratio
test statistic -2 ln(L.a/Lg) has asymptotically a chi-squared distribution
with one
Summarizing, we first estimate the number of regimes that thetwo-index
modelobeys.Oncethis number is determined, variation in market
sensitivity, interest-rate sensitivity, and residual variance is examined
across regimes.
Numerical optimization of the likelihood functions developed in this
paper use routines contained in Princeton University's GQOPT package: the
NMSIMP(Nelder-MeadSimplex Method) and GR.ADX(analgorithm using the
quadratic hill-climbing method). We use NMSIMPtoobtain starting points,
which are then used as input into the CRADX to produce parameter estimates
and c-values.14
5.RaveU.SDenositInstitutionsBecomeRiskier?
For S&Lsandthree classes of banks,Table 2 summarizes GQSRM tests of
thenumber of regimes in effect duringthe1975-85 period. For each class
ofinstitution and each regime, Table 3 presents estimates of the two-index
model. Table 3 also notes which parametersprovesignificant and reports
regime-switch dates and measures of the gradualness of each switch. Each
class undergoes either three or four shifts in parameter regimes.Most of
these shifts prove to be abrupt ones and the switch dates have overlapping
confidenceintervals. At the same time,the pattern of results indicates
that 1975-1985 information flows differentially affected different classes
of depository firms.
S&Ls and regional banks show an abrupt first switch in early 1976. (For
convenience, we term these first switches the 1976 switch).Money-center
and superregional banks' first switch and S&Ls' second switch occur at the
beginning of 1977 (the 1977 switch).
All bank groups experience a second switch near or in 1979, (the 1979
switch). In passing, we note that this was a time of marked changes in
operativeregulatory and monetary policy frameworks.Table2 shows
switchpoints for money-center, superregional and regional banks of 12/79,
5/79. and 9/78, respectively. The table also provides standard errors for
each estimated switch date. Regional banks second switch is determined to
be gradual rather than abrupt. The switch begins 7 months before the mean
dateof 9/78 and completes itself 7months after this date.15
Thethird switch occurs for all bank groups in thevicinityof 1982
(the 1982 switch), a year of considerable financial and regulatory turmoil.
Except for superregional banks, this switch is determined to be abrupt.
Money center, superregional and regionalbanks experience their third
switchesin 3/82, 10/81 and 11/82. These point estimates have standard
errors of 6 months, 5 months and 8 months, respectively.Using these
standard errors produces wide confidence intervals that include late 1981
and all or most of 1982. Even S&Ls' third switch in 9/81 falls within
interval estimates of the banks' 1982 switch.
SGrL's fourth switch falls in 9/83. Its standard error of 9 months
includes late 1982 and early 1984 in its 95 percent confidence interval.
The confidence interval for superregional banks' fourth switch is tightly
centered on 10/84.
5.1. Channs in Bank Riskiness
Table 4 tests parameter-equality constraints across regimes to identify
whetherand howeach of the three risk parameters varies. We focus first on
bank groupsnoting that interest sensitivity variessignificantly only
for the superregional group. The bulk of the action relates to changes in
market-beta and unsystematic risk measured as the regression residual
variance (a).
Variation in market beta. In the 1976 switch, regional banks' market-
beta declines dramatically.Market-betas formoney-centerandthe
superregional bank groups decrease at the beginning of 1977, but the decline16
isnot statistically significant for the money-center group.A further
statistically significant decrease in market-beta occurs only for money-
center and superregional banks in 1979 shift.
Inthe 1982 shift1 every bankclass experiences a statistically
significantincrease in market-beta.In their additional regime shift,
superregional banks' slight further increase in market-beta does not prove
statistically significant.
Thetemporal variability of the market sensitivity of bank stock may be
described as follows. At the start of our sample period, every bank class
hada market-beta in excess of one. In subsequent shifts, market-betas
decline broadly until 1982. During 1977-1982, bank market-betas fal1 below
unity. After 1982, market-betas increase back above unity.
These observed changes in the market risk of our very large sample
banks help to explain the low levels of market betas reported in Table 1.
The time periods examined in Table 1 included eras of below-averagemarket
riskfor bank stocks. We noted thatotherstudies that bracketthe early
1980sdevelop similar estimates (e.g. Smirlock and ICaufold, 1987). However,
Table 3 shows that banks' market beta lies below unity only during the 1977-
1982 period. Both before and after this interval, these coefficients lie
above unity.Studies which estimate bank systematicrisk as if it were
stationaryimproperly pool observations from different regimes.The
misleading inference, thatdevelopexemplify the dangers of choosing
analysisperiods arbitrarily or neglecting the possibility of parameter
shifts.17
Itis natural to hypothesize that the riskiness of bankstocks should
varywith changes in bank failure rates and(becauseof regulatory lags)
particularly with the number of banks classified •s problem cases by federal
examiners.Table 5 shows that failure rates and numbers of problem banks
were relatively highin thefirst twoyearsof our sampleandfell back to
lowerlevels between 1977 and 1981.Both series jump sharply in 1982.
These data support the CQSRM analysis of temporal variation in market risk.
Variation in other narameters. Unsystematic risk also falls and rises, but
for the regionals and superregionals also falls again in the 1980s. In the
firstswitch, all bank groups experience a significant decrease in
unsystematic risk. However, as early as the 1979 switch, unsystematic risk
begins to rise. During the 1979-82 period of generally high unsystematic
risk, market risk and bank failure rates remain relatively low.
As noted earlier, little significant temporal variation occurs in bank
interest sensitivity. Positive coefficients occur for all bank groups during
all but two of the regimes delineated. This implies a conventional inverse
relationship between bank stock returns and market interest tates. No bank
group shows significant interest-rate sensitivity before the 1979 switch.
Only during 1979-1982 volatile interest rate era do all bank groups show
significant interest-rate sensitivity.Our observed great variation in
interest-sensitivity can account for the seemingly inconsistent conclusions
of empirical investigations using smaller time periods and different size
compositions of sample banks. Differences in results maytraceto
differences in the character of and market environments operative in these18
authors' samples. Once again, we see the importance of allowing for possible
nonstationarities before drawing inferences from regression results.
5.2. A Look at Survivorshio Bias in the Money-Center Croun
Our sample includes no officially failed banks. However, the Bank of
America and Continental Illinois may be described as quasi-failures. As a
sensitivity experiment, we exclude Continental Illinois and Bank of America
from the money-center group to examine whether these banks distort findings
for this group. Table 6 reports regressions for this edited subsample and
for Continental Illinois taken by itself. Comparing Table 3 and 6 shows that
money-center banks' switch points do not differ significantly between the
two subsamples and that risk parameters behave similarly. On the other hand,
taking Continental by itself shows some substantial differences. Continental
skipped the 1977 shift and developed a negative market beta in 1979. Its
1982 increases in beta move against those for other money-center banks. The
April 1984 shift coincides with an announced increase of $400 million in its
problem loans, starting the rim which led to its de facto nationalization.
In its 4/84 shift, all risk components increase, but with only the increase
inunsystematic risk proving statistically significant. Continental's
federal rescue appears to destroy the two-index model's applicability,
inasmuch as neither beta attains significance in the post-rescue regime.
Interestingly, in its prefailure period Continental shows no significant
interest sensitivity. As our S&t sample, this may indicate that its deposit
insurerwas absorbing the bulk of interest induced gains and losses dring
this troubled time. The plausibility of this interpretation is also19
supported by the failure of the parameter regime for other money-center
banks to shift in the wake of the Continental crisis.
5.3ChantesinS&LRiskiness
For S&Ls, the last column of Table 4 tests for parameter inequality
across regimes. As do regional banks, S&Ls experience significant shifts in
market and unsystematic risk in early 1976, developing a significantly
negative market-beta and greatly enbanced interest sensitivity. However,
S&Ls show an abrupt second shift in 4/77,one combining increases in
unsystematic risk and market-beta with reduced interest sensitivity.
In contrast to the 1979 shift for bank groups, the return-generating
process for our small sample of S&.Lsshowsno switch during the 1979-1980
era. S&Ls undergo their third shift in late 1981, with market and
unsystematic risk doublingandinterestsensitivitydecliningto
insignificance.
In the late-1983 shift, market risk declines andinterestsensitivity
rises (both significantly), while the fall in unsystematic risk fails to
achieve statistical significance.
As we did for banks, we may compare temporal variation in market and
unsystematic risk with fluctuations in problem and failed institutions.
Unfortunately, time series of failures and problem S&Ls are not routinely
publishedby the FederalHome Loan Bank Board. For 1975-1985, Table S
reports, as a proxy for problem S&Ls,thenumber of S6,Lswhosenet worth is
less than or equal to zero underGenerallyAccepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP). We call these institutions GAAP-insolvent S&Ls."20
Table 5 shows that the number of failed S&I.ssurgedsharply in 1982,
with a parallel rise in CAAP-insolvent institutions. Although the number of
failed S&Lsdeclinessignificantly in 1984, a second sharp surge in the
number of CAAP-insolventS&Ls is observed. This suggests that the reduced
failure rate reflects FSLIC's own growing economic insolvency and staffing
weaknessand not an across-the boardimprovementinindustry
credibility. In S&Ls' fourth regime, market and unsystematic risk reach
peaks for the 1975-1985 period. This peak is consistent with S&L failure
rates but not with the trend in GM! insolvency. With only 8 extremely large
S&Ls in our sample (and most of these headquartered in California), it is
doubtful that the regression shifts we observe are representative of the S&L
industry as a whole.
Interest-rate sensitivity varies over a far wider range of values for
S&Ls than for banks. Moreover, three out of the four shifts in SM. interest-
rate sensitivity prove significant. During their first regime and third
regime when market-betas were at high levels, SM. interes; sensitivity is
not significantly different from zero. In the remaining three regimes, SM.
stock proves significantly market and interest-rat, sensitive. During the
9/81-9/83 regime, although interest rates were highly volatile, S&L stock
shows near-zero interest sensitivity. This may trace not only to a higher
incidence of adjustable-rate mortgages and to mortgage prepayments in the
last part of this era, but also to the extent of hidden economic insolvency
at sample S&Ls. Deep insolvencies could have forced the FSLIC to absorb the21
bulk of interest induced profits and losses on short-funded positions in
long assets during this particularly troubled era.
5.4 Some Observed Implications
The observed pattern of coefficient change indicates that the riskiness
of sample bank and S&L stocks declined in the late 1970s, but rose again in
recent years. Of course our sample of banks and S&Ls is not necessarily
representative of banks and S&Ls as a whole. The sample includes only very
large institutions. Moreover, using monthly observations reduces the power
of our tests. The wide confidence intervals that attach to the 1979 and 1982
switch dates are particularly unfortunate. Macroeconomic and regulatory
events taking place in these eras call out for tighter estimates. Daily or
weekly data might let us develop closer estimates of the timing of the
structural changes in return-generating processes.
This paper does not attempt to link its statistical findings with
particular information events. Although the switches could be shown to
coincide with various information flows, without analyzing a full chronology
of potential information events and considering potentially relevant omitted
variables, asserting such links would overreach the regression experiments
we conduct.
A growing literature has sought to explain cross-sectional differences
in bank stocks' interest-sensitivity (e.g. Flannery and James l984a, Brewer
and Lee 1985. and Tarhan 1987). These studies all assume interest-
sensitivity is stationary over the periods they analyze. However, because
our findings indicate that interest sensitivity shifted importantly over22
theseauthors' analysis periods, suchnonstationarity needsto be taken into
account. Modelling this nonstationarity endogenously over timewouldamount
todeveloping a model of the repricing process for deposit-institution
6
stock.
6. Reassessina Event Studies
Several authors use 1975-85 data to investigate the impact of selected
information events on bank stocks. We focus on papers concerned with events
occuring in 1979 (1979 event studies) or in 1982 (1982 event studies). Our
estimatedswitch dates establish a perspective from which to reinterpret
these studies.
6.1 1979 Event Studies
Aharony,Saunders, and Swary (1986) examine the impact on commercial
banksof the well-publicized October 6, 1979 change in Federal Reserve
operating procedures. Using weekly data and a two-index model, they
postulate the possibility of a parameter shift on this date. To test for
risk changes, they estimate marketrisk, interest-raterisk,and
unsystematic risk for the twoyearsbracketing the October 1979 announcement
date. For every bank group they examine, tests of risk-parameter equality
uncover no significant change in market or interest-rate risk across the two
years.
Brickley and James (1986) investigate how modification of insolvency
rules by the FSLIC in 1980 might have affected common-stock returns for
financial institutions. Using weekly returns, and taking January 1980 as the
date that insolvency rules were relaxed, these authors test the hypothesis23
that market risk and interest sensitivity prove lower in the 1980-1982
perio4 than in the 1.976-1979 period. For S&Ls but not for banks,they find
significant decreases in these sensitivity measures.
In the finance literature, it is commonplace to investigate the risk
impact of regulatory changes in this fashion. Among others, Benston (1973),
Miarony, Jones and Swary, Aharony and Swary (1981), Smirlock (1984), and
Laity and Thompson (1986) employ similar methods. But two problems inhere in
this approach (Unal 1987). First, precise dates for regime switches are
imposed a priori and never tested. Second, possibilities for parameter
change are restricted to a narrow subset of regulatory and legislative
"event dates." Event-study researchers neither identify nor control for the
effects of other information events that might develop at nearby dates. For
example, while Mtarony Al.(1986)associate their regression findings
with the Federal Reserve's October, 1979 announcement, Brickley and James
link the same class of regression results to a January, .1980 action by
FSLIC. Failure to impose statistical controls for other information events
increases the probability of falsely accepting or rejecting the null
hypothesis.
Our method does find switches for every bank group in 1979. However,
because the switch-point estimates have large standard errors, we cannot
tightly bracket the switch dates on the Fed's October, 1979 announcement. 95
percent confidence intervals of the switch dates for all bank groups span
much of 1979.We observe that after these shifts bank groupsexperience
significantinterest-rate sensitivity, lower market risk and higher24
unsystematic risk.It is striking that the return-generating process for
our small sample of S&Ls shows no switch in the 1978-1980 era.
A hallmark of the late 1970s is the many ways in which banking and S&L
regulatorssought to help their regulatees to reduce burdens that deposit-
rate ceilings would otherwise have imposed. For example, Money Market
Certificateswere authorized in May. 1978. In this same month the Fed
authorizedcommercial banks to offer automatic transfer service (ATS)
accounts. A lawsuit challenging the authority of the Fed and other
regulators to authorize this and various other forms of implicit interest
was denied by a District Court in October 1978, but in April 1979 the Court
of Appeals for that District reversed this finding. Congress was saddled
with a yearend deadline either to authorize ATS iccounts and other popular
regulatory innovations or to see them lapse. After voting itself a three-
month extension, on March 31,1980 Congress legalized thechallenged
regulatory innovations and set up a six-year phase-out of deposit-rate
ceilings on time and savings accounts.
Presuming a sharp causal connection between specifié monetary or
regulatory events and shifts in regression parameters goes beyond the
inferential reach of the data actually examined. Clearly, given the ebb and
flow of regulatory, judicial, and legislative events, it is rash to
associate parameter shifts (nonshifts) for commercial-banks or S&Lsin1978-
1979 with specific dates, whoisto say which regulatory actions, monetary-
policy changes, modificat!on of insolvency rules, court decisions, or steps
in the passage of the 1980 legislation, competitive developments, were more25
important than other events? A cautious observer can only say that the 1978-
79 period includes numerous developments that might jointly or individually
have supported expectations revisions large enough to induce a shift (or
nonshift) in the return-generating processes for deposit-institution stocks.
6.2 1982 Event Studies
To put the specific events analyzed by 1982 event studies into broad
perspective,it is instructive to consider a partial chronology of
information events that might have proved relevant in 1982. Early in 1982,
nonperforming loans increased sharply at large banks and the SEC authorized
shelf-registration. Shelf-registration promised to make it easier for large
firms to issue open-market securities as an alternative to bank loans, in
March a Joint Congressional Resolution held it to be the "sense of Congress"
that the full faith and credit of the U.S. Treasury stood behind federal
depositinsurance. Other worrisome events in early 1982 include:Drysdale
Government Securities' slide into bankruptcy by mid-May, the developing Penn
Square crisis, and the LDC debt crisis. The office of the Comptroller of
the Currency closed the Penn Square Bank on July 5.Inmid-August, Mexico
declared a moratorium on its foreign debt.However, negative information
about the value of Latin America debt arrived throughout 1982. In late
summer or early fall the Fed is said to have readopted a policy of interest-
rate smoothing. In November, Congress passed the Garn-St Germain Act, aimed
at forestalling the collapse of the S&L industry. The Act also authorized
Money Market Deposit Accounts and Super NOW accounts. These instruments hit
the market in December, when the Fed also reduced its discount rate to the26
lowest level in four years. Completing the picture, we recall from Table S
that 1982 is a year when the number of failed and problem institutions
surges sharply.
Thus, 1982 shapes up as a crucial year for the deposit-institution
industry.Despite these many and variegated events, Lamy and Thompson
(1986) treat the Penn-Square crisis as thi dominant event in this time
interval, using the market model to estimate shifts in market risk and
unsystematic risk for the 100 trading days preceding and 25 trading days
following July 6,1982.They find no significant shift in marketrisk
between these periods, but a significant shift in unsystematic risk.They
use this as "evidence of a structural change in the pricing mechanism for
bank stocks after the Penn Square failure."
Mexico'smoratoriumannouncementin August. 1982 is the only
development we know to spawn four independent event studies [Smirlock and
Kaufold 1985, Schoder and Vankudre 1986, cornell and Shapiro 1986, and
Bruner and Simms, 1987J. Broadly, these studies analyze the response of bank
stock prices on or around the announcement-day for the moratorium. In
focusing on announcement-day"abnormal returns" or parameter shifts,these
authorsdonot control for the possibility of parameter nonstationarity
elsewhere in 1982, The flow of information events throughout 1982 provides
reason to believe that deposit-institution riskiness may be fluctuating.
Estimating abnormal returns without allowing for alternative shift dates or
nonstationarities may lead a researcher falsely to accept or to reject
event-study hypotheses.27
Alsoocusing on 1982, Fraser, Richards and Fosberg (1985) seek to
determinei;adirection of the impact of Super WOWs on bank shareholder
wealth.They useatwo-index model to estimate abnormal returns, but
without con..xolling for changes in slopes or residualvariance. They report
that'..wh.tlemoneycenter banks were essentially unaffected by the
announcementof Super NOWs,(excess returns for) regional banks were
strongly (and negatively) affected.'However, the significant shift our
methods find in the market-beta for regional banks explains the negative
abnormal returns these authors report as the consequence of an abrupt market
repricing necessary to let these stocks offer appropriatecxante
compensation for their now-heightened market risk.
Our statistical findings reflect the financial and regulatory turmoil
of 1982.S&Ls and every bank class we examine experience switches in or
near 1982 that show a significant increase in market risk.Money-center
banks and S&LS also show increased unsystematic risk. The estimated shift
is a gradual one for superregional banks.For the other bank classes,
because observed switch dates have large standard errors, almost any date in
1982 could pass muster as a potential switching point.The overriding
problem is that so many potential events can be identified in 1982 that it
ispresumptuous to label anyone of them as the precise cause of the
nonstationarityourmethods uncover.28
7. Summary
Two types of evidence are developed in this paper: substantive and
methodological.Substantively, we show that our sample ofdeposit-
institution stocks became riskier investments in the wake of the many
regulatory relaxations made in the l980s. 1979 and 1982 are affirmed as
years when information events substantially affected return-generating
processes for deposit-institution stock. Bank market risk lies below unity
only during the 1977-1982 period. Both before and after this interval, bank
market risk lies above unity. Our methods find bank equity returns to be
interest-sensitive primarily during the 1979-82 era, but SM. equity returns
to be interest-sensitive during the bulk of the observation period.
Methodologically, we show thatusing GQSRNtoidentify
nonstationarities in deposit-institution equity returnssupportsthe
hypothesis that information flows have differentially affected different
types and sizes of institutions. These same nonstationarities underscore
the unreliability of traditional event-study methods. It is inappropriate
to designate a potential shift date without also allowing for the effects of
otherinformation events or controlling for observable nonstationarities in
returns that occur in the neighborhood of a researcher's event window.29
NOTES
1. Flannery and James (1984a) and Brewer and Iee(1985)focus on the
relation between banks'interest-ratesensitivity andtheirbalance-sheet
composition. This leads them to test the interest-rate sensitivity of the
institutions incl'.tded in their sample. In a related study, Martin and
Iceown (1977) investigate the importance of extra-market sources of
covariation. They find significant covariance among the unsystematic-risk
parameters for financial institutions and suggest that this may reflect
an interest-rate factor.
2. Althoughvery few institutions of the size sampled on CRSPtapes
disappearedover the sample period (e.g., Penn Square Bank and Franklin
National Bank), a survivorship bias is built into this approach.
3.GoldfeldandQuandt(1973, p 479)indicatethat this statistic "appears
infinite samples to be well approximated"bytheChi-squared
distribution.
4. Theconditionality of higher-round tests on the outcome of previous
rounds of testing means that we should tighten the test criterion to
maintaina fixed level of significance. Our procedure may be said to fix
a maximal number of regimes that might be operative during the analysis
period.
5.Again,although this statistic tests the parameter-equality hypothesis,
somesmall-sample bias may exist.
6. A related study (Unal and Kane, 1987) constructs and estimates a model of
this repricing process.30
table1: Estimates of Market and Interest RateSensitivity forBank
PortfoliosReported in the Literature and Comparison of These















































1. Flannery and James, 1984 (FJ), use NYSE Composite Index as the market
return.They use three interest-rate indices. Theinterest-rate
coefficient reported here is estimated using the residuals of an AR(3)
model for the weekly holding-period return for GNM&8percent
certificates.
2. Scott and Peterson, 1986 (SP), use the 562500 return index and monthly
percentage changes in 30-year Treasury bond yields as proxies for the
market index and the interest-rate index, respectively.
3. Brewer and Lee, 1986 (EL), use the value-weighted NYSE and AMEX
composite index obtained from CRSP to proxy market returns. Their proxy
for the interest-rate index is the difference between the 3-month
Treasury bill rate at time t and the forward 3-month Treasury bill rate
imbedded •in the yield curve at time t-1. The reported estimates are
obtained from cross-section time-series data.
4. The analysis period is chosen to coincide with that of Chance and Lane
(1980) and Sweeney and Warga (1986).
&:t-valuesare given in parentheses and are significant at the 1 percent
level unless marked with a double asterisk (**).31
Table 2: Likelihood-Ratio Test to Determine the Number of Regimes in Effect
During the 1975-85 period by institution class.
Institutjon/Refime (L*/L) -2 .tN(L*/L
1.Money Center Banks
a1 vs. P.2 201.56/211.52 19.92
a2 vs. P.3 211.52/222.43 21.82
a3 vs. P.4 222.43/235.67 26.48
P.4 vs. P.5 235.67/238.10 4.86*
2.Superregional Banks
a1 vs. 251.12/259.83 17.42
R2 vs. R3 259.83/269.18 16.70
a3 vs. a4 269.18/277.64 16.92
P.4 vs. P5 277.64/285.82 16.36
P.5 vs. P6 285.82/288.42 5.20*
3.Regional Banks
a1 vs. P2 240.54/247.32 13.56
a2 vs. K3 247.32/255.16 15.68
R3 vs. P4 255.16/261.93 13.54
P4 vs. P5 261.93/267.03 10.20*
4.Savings and Loan Associations
P.1 vs. R.2 161.09/168.66 15.14
P.2 vs. R3 168.66/176.41 15.50
vs. P.4 176.41/184.09 15.36
P.4 vs. P.5 184.09/192.29 16.40
vs. P6 192.29/1.95.47 6.36*
Notes: Criticalvalue for 6 d.f. at 5percentsignificance is 12.592.(*)
indicatesthat the hypothesis of an additional regime is rejected at S
percent significance.32









StartingDate 1/75 1/75 1/75 1/75
1.40* 1.36* 1.33* 1.84*
'nil
.20 .33 .43 1.35
01
.06 .04 .05 .09
Switch Point 25.20 (.98) 24.75 (.57) 13.76 (.42) 14.00.(.03
Implied Date 1/77 1/77 2/76 2/76
Switch Std. Dev. .65 .12 .25 .01
ft 1.03* .92* •43* .1.12*
m2
i2
.35 -.26 .35 3.02*
02
.02 .02 .02 .03
Switch Point 60.43 (3.11) 53.19 (1.47) 45.19 (5.93) 28.15 (.9)
Implied Date 12/79 5/79 9/78 4/77
Switch Std. Dev. 1.21 .15 7.00* .02
m3 .07 •45* 57* 1.17*
i3 45* •54* .27* 1.27*
.04 .04 .04 .05
Switch Point 86.53 (6.28) 81.62 (4.98) 95.34(8.22) 81.30 (.9)
Implied Date 3/82 10/81 11/82 9/81
Switch Std. Dev. 2.1 2.8 .06 .1
1.19* 1.03* 2.67*
.16 .38 .43
04 .06 .04 .03 .10
Switch Point - 118.12(.1)
- 105.3(9.1
Implied Date - 10/84
- 9/83
Switch Std. Dev. - .59 - 1.59
- 1.37* - 1.01*
- - .24 - 1.36*
- . 01 - .06
Ending Date 12/85 12/85 12/85 12/85
Notes: (*) indicates significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level
The standard error of each switch point is given in parentheses. All intercep
estimates are small and fail to be statistically significant at 5 percent.33
Table 4: Likelihood-Ratio Test of Shifts in Risk Parameters During the 1975-85
period.
Parameter Money CenterSuperregionalRegional S&Ls
Restriction Banks Banks Banks
1977Switch 1976 Switch
0m2m1 1.68 394* 7.70* 15.58*
i2i1
.38 1.34 .12 1.42
27.50* 23.58* 9.56* 16.82*
1979 Switch 1977 Switch
mfm2 20.78* 6.16* .58 15.58*
i3i2
.22 7.98* .44 6.22*
8.60* 19.68* 13.76* 5.00*
1982 Switch
m4m3 18.44* 10.34* 5.36* 6.40*
.04 2.36 .32 2.56*
0403 6.40* .04 1.04 17.26*





0504 - 5.10* .92
Notes: The test statistic is -2 tn(L*/L), where L* and Lare restricted and
unrestricted maximum likelihood values. Critical values for 1 d.f. at 5 percent
and 10 percent significance are 3.84 and 2.71, respectively. (*) indicates that
the coefficient shift is significant at 5 percent. No shift in intercept proves
significant at 5 percent.34
Table 5: Number of Problem Banks, Failed Banks and S&Ls, and GM?
insolvent S&Ls.
Year Failed Problem Failed GAAP-Insolvent






1975 14 347 11 17
1976 17 385 9 11
1977 6 368 9 8
1978 7 342 3 4
1979 10 287 3 13
1980 10 217 35 17
1981 10 223 81 65
1982 42 369 252 201
1983 48 642 101 287
1984 79 847 42 434
1985 120 1140 70 450
Sources: Information on banks is compiled from Kane (1985) and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation's 1985 Annual Renort. S&L information comes
from FHLBB files and Barth, Brumbaugh and Sauerhaft (1986).
Notes: "Failure" is defined as a regulator-induced cessation of
autonomous operations. It includes supervisory mergers or acquisitions and
loose forms of conservatorship such as the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's
ManagementConsignment Program. "Problem banks" are those that are
classified as such by FDIC examiners. "CAAP-Insolvent S&Ls"is defined as
those S&t..s whose net worth is less than or equal to zero under Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).35
Table 6: Maximum-Likelihood Estimates of Regime Parameters for Money-Center
Banks (excluding Continental Illinois and Bank of America) and
Continental Illinois for the 1975-1985 period








Switch Point 25.41 (.76) 59.01 (.08)
Implied Date 1/77 11/79




Switch Point 62.42 (2.88) 82.14 (4.23)
Implied Date 2/80 10/81




Switch Point 86.49 (6.21) 111.95 (4.44)
Implied Date 3/82 4/84




Ending Date 12/85 12/85
Notes:(*) indicates significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.
The standard error of each switch point is given in parentheses.Appendix 1: List of Sample Banks and Savings and Loan Associations
3
AssetSize
Institution Million S. End of 1984
Money Center Banks
1. BankAmerica Corp
2. Bankers Trust of New York Corp.
3. Chase Manhattan Corp.
4. Chemical Bank of New York Corp.
5. Citicorp
6.Continental Bank of Illinois Corp.
7. First Chicago Corp.
8. Manufacturers Hanover Corp.
9. J.P. Morgan andCo.Inc.
Superregional banks
Bank of Boston
Bank of New York, Inc.




Marine Midland Banks, Inc.
NBD Bancorp, Inc.
Norwest Corp.
Republic New York Corp.
Southeast Banking Corp.
Texas Commerce Bancshares, Inc.
Wells Fargo and Co.
tonal Banks
1. Bank of Virginia
2. Equimark Corp.
3. First Pennsylvania Corp.
4. First Virginia Banks, Inc.
5. First Wisconsin Corp.
6. Fleet Financial Group, Inc.
7. General Bancshares Corp.
8. United Jersey Banks Hackensack
9. Wachovia Corp.
Savinzs and LoanAssociations
Abmanson H.F. & Co.
Far West Financial Corp.
Financial Corporation of America
Gibraltar Financial Corp.
Golden West Financial Corp. DEL
Great Western Financial Corp.

































































Note: Asset sizes are from consolidated holding-company
shown in Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, 1984 and3?
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